This paper focuses on the sluggish growth of world trade relative to income growth in recent years. The analysis uses an empirical strategy based on an error correction model to assess whether the global trade slowdown is structural or cyclical. An estimate of the relationship between trade and income in the past four decades reveals that the long-term trade elasticity rose sharply in the 1990s, but declined significantly in the 2000s even before the global financial crisis. These results suggest that trade is growing slowly not only because of slow growth of gross domestic product, but also because of a structural change in the trade-gross domestic product relationship in recent years. The available evidence suggests that the explanation may lie in the slowing pace of international vertical specialization rather than increasing protection or the changing composition of trade and gross domestic product. . This slowdown has received much attention (from, among others, Davies, 2013, and Krugman, 2013) , but not been subject to rigorous analysis. One question is whether the slower growth in trade simply reflects the sluggishness of GDP or whether there is a deeper structural shift in the relationship between trade and GDP. Furthermore, if there is indeed a structural shift, is it a post-crisis phenomenon or does it reflect longer-term factors? And what might these factors be?
We use a simple empirical strategy based on an error correction model to address these questions. We first estimate the relationship between trade and income for the period . While the global trade slowdown is a recent phenomenon, the analysis of a long time period can shed light on structural changes that may have occurred in the trade-income relationship and that may help to explain more recent events. We find that the long-term elasticity of trade with respect to income was 1.3 between 1970 and 1985, rose A focus on the 2000s shows that the decline in the long-run trade elasticity, from the high levels of the 1990s, set in before the global financial crisis and was accentuated in the postcrisis world. We divide the period in two parts, before and after the Great Recession, and 1 estimate the long-run trade elasticity for the two sub-periods. We find that a 1 percent increase in income was associated to a 1.5 and a 0.7 increase in trade in the period 2001-2007 and 2008-2013, respectively . These results indicate that the change in the trade-income relationship cannot be entirely attributed to the financial crisis and suggest that global trade is growing slowly not only because GDP growth is sluggish, but also because the trade-GDP relationship changed. An implication is that even if GDP growth picks up, we may not see the dramatic rates of trade growth witnessed in the 1990s.
We formally investigate these ideas using the results of our empirical model to decompose the cyclical and structural components of trade growth and to predict trade growth in coming years. First, we find that while cyclical effects dominate during periods of crisis such as the We show that the extent of the global trade slowdown in coming years will depend on whether the estimates for the 2008-2013 period are "transitional" or properly capture changes in the long-term association between trade and income.
The factors behind the decline in the elasticity of trade could range from protectionism to the changing structure of trade and aggregate demand. The preliminary evidence considered here suggests that the explanation lies primarily in changes in international vertical specialization, most notably in the United States and China. For example, as we show below, Chinese exporters are now using more domestically produced inputs than imported inputs; the share of Chinese imports of parts and components in total exports has decreased from 60 percent in the mid-1990s to 35 percent today.
responsiveness of trade to income, but the evidence suggests that their role was less prominent.
Our work relates to two branches of economic literature. A first set of papers analyzed the changes in the long-run relationship between trade and income. Irwin (2002) documents the variation of the world trade elasticity between 1870 and 2000 providing valuable insights into the underlying factors. Freund (2009) calculates the elasticity of trade to GDP in tranquil and crisis times, and shows that the latter tends to be higher. Escaith et al. (2010) provide evidence of the increase in the world trade elasticity in the 1990s and relate this to the process of vertical specialization. Differently from these studies, our main interest is in understanding the extent to which changes in the long-run trade and income relationship can explain the global trade slowdown. We also attempt to analyze in a more systematic way some of the factors that may underpin the changing relationship between trade and GDP.
Our work also relates to the wide literature on the trade collapse of 2008 (among others, Bems et al., 2010 , Levchenko et al., 2010 , Bussiere et al., 2013 , Abiad et al., 2014 This literature studies the causes of the sudden, severe and synchronized collapse of world trade that followed the global financial crisis in [2008] [2009] . The emerging consensus is that the driving factor of the collapse was the sharp contraction in aggregate demand, concentrated on trade-intensive components, and amplified by other factors, such as inventory effects and trade credit constraints (Bems et al., 2013) . Our study complements this work by taking a longer-term view and investigating the structural versus cyclical determinants of the current trade slowdown. Interestingly, we document that while cyclical factors dominated the trade collapse, structural determinants are key to understanding the current slowdown.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present some stylized facts about the trade slowdown. In Section III, we estimate the elasticity of trade with respect to GDP for the period 1970-2013 and take a closer look at the 2000s, pre and post-Great Recession. In Section IV, we decompose the trade slowdown into its short and long-run components and use model estimates to obtain trade projections. Section V presents an analysis of the factors that may explain the decline in long-term elasticity. Section VI concludes.
II. THE GLOBAL TRADE SLOWDOWN: SOME STYLIZED FACTS
Trade recovered after the global financial crisis, but trade growth has been sluggish since then. After a solid post-recession rebound in 2010, when the volume of global trade rose 13 percent, trade volumes grew by 6.2 percent in 2011, 2.8 percent in 2012 and 3.0 percent in 2013 ( Figure 1 ). This is well below the pre-crisis average trade growth of 7.1 percent (1987-2007) and is slightly below the growth rate of world GDP in real terms, which has hovered around 3 percent in recent years. These recent developments in international trade growth are now commonly referred to as the "global trade slowdown" (see, for instance, Donnan, 2014) . Alongside these cyclical factors, however, there may be other (structural) components of the global trade slowdown. Figure 4 shows that, while after the crisis most countries/regions have a stable import to GDP ratio, this "flatness" appears to pre-date the crisis for China and the US where import volumes as a share in real GDP have been roughly constant for nearly a decade. This fact may point to a structural change in the relationship between trade and income, at least for the two largest economies.
Visual inspection of the data of world trade (import volume) and world income (real GDP) indicates that the relationship between trade and income changed in the last decades ( Figure   5 ). Specifically, the period 1986-2000, which we call the "long 1990s", were different from the preceding and the subsequent period. 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRADE-INCOME RELATIONSHIP
To examine the relationship between trade and income in greater detail, we follow the literature and use an Error Correction Model (ECM), which makes it possible to account for the serial correlation of residuals. In particular, we are interested in estimating the long-run income elasticity of trade (in short, the trade elasticity), which measures the long-run relationship between trade and income. Further, we estimate the short-term determinants of trade: the shortrun trade elasticity, which measures the relationship between trade and income in the shortrun, and the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. Specifically, we use a regression of the form
where Δ denotes first differences, mt is the import volume and yt is real GDP at time t, α is a constant, and εt is the error term. In this framework, the short-run trade elasticity is β, while the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is -γ. The long-run trade elasticity is given by -δ/γ.
As discussed in the introduction, these types of import demand equations have been widely used in the empirical trade literature (including, more recently, in Irwin (2002 ), Freund (2009 ), Escaith et al. (2010 , Bussiere et al. (2013) ). The theoretical underpinning is the standard constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand system, under which import demand, an aggregate of individual imports (e.g. services and goods), is a function of aggregate demand, an aggregate of individual components of demand (e.g. consumption and investment). While in this section we follow the standard approach and regress (aggregate) import volumes on GDP, in Section V we study the relationship between the individual components of imports and GDP.
A well-known limitation of this empirical approach is that it presumes that world income is an exogenous variable that has contributed to the increasing levels of world trade, when in fact both are endogenous variables that are co-determined. These regressions should, therefore, be seen only as useful reduced-form specifications that illustrate the changing correlation between trade and income, which is the main focus of this paper. They do not, however, capture the complex and structural relationship between these two variables and its deeper determinants.
A. Trade and Income in 1970-2013: Annual Data
In this subsection, we begin looking at the trade-income relationship using annual data for the period 1970-2013. While the global trade slowdown is seen as a recent phenomenon, investigating a sufficiently long time period is essential to detect structural changes that may have occurred in the relationship between trade and income. The results for this period are presented in Table 1 . The next subsection will take a closer look at the dynamics of the trade and income data before and after the Great Recession.
For the entire sample, the long-run elasticity (-δ/γ) is 1.7, but the response of trade with respect to income differs considerably across the three periods. In the period 1986-2000, a 1 percent increase in world real GDP is associated with a 2.2 percent increase in the volume of world trade. This elasticity is substantially higher than in the preceding period (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) and in the subsequent period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) , for both of which the trade elasticity was 1.3.
Using a non-linear Wald test to assess the presence of structural changes in the sample, we find that there is a significant structural break in the long-run trade-income relationship in the long 1990s relative to the preceding and subsequent periods. 5 The null hypothesis that the long-run trade elasticity differs across the first and the latter periods is, however, rejected.
The short-run dynamics of the data also present interesting variations during the three periods. The estimates of the short-run elasticity  increased over time: While the question of the structural versus the cyclical components of the global trade slowdown will be addressed more precisely below, these regression results already reveal some patterns. Specifically, world trade has become more responsive on impact to changes in world income in the 2000s compared to the long 1990s (higher short-run trade elasticity), but at the same time it has also showed a tendency to grow more slowly than world income (lower long-run trade elasticity). This finding suggests that, in addition to cyclical factors, structural elements contributed to the global trade slowdown in 2012 and 2013. World trade is growing more slowly in recent years, not only because GDP has been sluggish, but also because the long-run link between trade and income has changed in recent years. In some sense, the long 1990s appear as an exceptional period and the reasons for this exceptional behavior of trade will be further investigated in Section V. Recursive estimation tests (not presented in the paper for brevity) confirm these results. 6 Note that residuals are always found to be stationary. Moreover, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test generally accepts the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation in the residuals of the linear regression. These results further justify the use of the ECM specification. While we always perform these tests and report them in key tables, we do not discuss them in the text as findings are broadly supportive of the model specification used.
B. Trade and Income Before and After the Great Recession: Quarterly Data
In this section, we use (seasonally adjusted) quarterly data to study the changing tradeincome relationship within the 2000s. 7 We divide the period in roughly half: pre-Great
Recession ( Table 2 , which also reports for comparison the estimates of the coefficients in equation (1) The pre-and the post-Great Recession periods display some distinctive common features, most notably the lower long-run elasticity compared to the 1990s and the higher short-run responsiveness of trade to income shocks. 8 In this respect, these findings confirm the insights of the previous subsection: The global trade slowdown has deep roots, and the change in the income-trade relationship is not a byproduct of the financial crisis.
But the pre-and post-Great Recession periods also present some remarkable differences. In particular, the long-run link between trade and income appears much more attenuated after the financial crisis. A legitimate question is whether this lower long-run trade elasticity truly reflects a structural shift. Performing a non-linear Wald test indicates that there is a significant structural break between the period preceding and the one following the crisis.
However, it is difficult to rule out that the long-run post-crisis trade elasticity is affected by the long cycle that appears to characterize the Great Recession, particularly in the context of advanced economies. 9 In this context, a period of five years may be too short to capture longrun trends and the current estimate may capture a "transitional" rather than a long-run elasticity.
IV. THE GLOBAL TRADE SLOWDOWN IN RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
In the previous section, we analyzed the dynamics of trade and income data and estimated the long-run and short-run elasticities of trade with respect to income as well as the speed of adjustment of trade to its long-run equilibrium. The key finding is that the relationship between world trade and world income has undergone a structural change. While the short- 8 Formal tests confirm that there is a significant structural break between the 1990s and the 2000s (both, pre and post-Great Recession). 9 Several factors could in principle disproportionately affect trade. For instance, deleveraging in advanced economies impacts durable goods (that are more trade intensive) to a larger extent than non-durable goods. Confidence about future prospects may have a similar effect on trade, as it also disproportionately affects demand of durables.
run impact of changes in income on trade has increased over time, the long-run link between these variables has attenuated. Section V will investigate the potential causes of the changing long-run relationship between trade and income. In this section, we use the results from the empirical model to decompose the cyclical and structural factors of the 2012-2013 global trade slowdown and to obtain model-consistent trade projections for 2014-2019.
A. Cyclical versus Structural Factors
The evidence in Section III creates a presumption that, in addition to cyclical factors, there is a structural component to the current slow growth of world trade. Here we investigate the relative importance of these factors, by decomposing the growth rate of imports into its structural and cyclical components.
The import growth decomposition requires a few steps. We first obtain the import growth predicted by our model (m ), by applying the estimated coefficients of equation (1) to the actual data. The predicted import growth is given by the following condition:
where m =  ln mt is the growth rate of imports at time t and  ,  ,  , and  are the estimates of coefficients in equation (1) .
Note that equation (1) can be rewritten as:
where α1 + α2 = α. The term in square brackets is the residual of the cointegration equation, which gives the long run relationship between imports and GDP. We can use this relationship to calculate the long-run import growth predicted by the model. Specifically, from the residual of the cointegration equation we have that:
where ln m is the predicted log long-run level of imports at time t. Hence, taking the difference of equations (6) and (7), we obtain m = ln m -ln m = -(  ⁄ ) (ln yt -ln yt-1). (7) Since we already know the estimated long-run elasticity(−   ⁄ ), we can use equation (7) to calculate the long-run import growth predicted by the model (m ).
The last step is to obtain the part of the import growth predicted by the ECM framework and associated with the short-run factors (the impact elasticity and the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium of trade). We can obtain the short-term component of import growth (m ) by subtracting equation (7) -the predicted long-run growth of imports-from equation The cyclical effects can be further decomposed into the two offsetting factors: the impact growth and the speed of adjustment. The first term is given by  (ln y t -ln y t-1 ), where  is the estimated short-run elasticity, while the adjustment component can be calculated by subtracting this term from the short-run predicted growth of imports m . Does the current global trade slowdown reflect cyclical or structural factors? Both are clearly involved. The cyclical component of world import growth (the impact growth and the adjustment term) has been negative in 2012 and 2013. As reported in Table 3 , the short-term component of import growth (m ) is equal to -0.9 percent for both years. This negative cyclical factor has contributed to the sluggish performance of imports. The long-run import growth (m ), however, has also been strongly subdued. Specifically, long-term components of import growth are respectively 4.2 and 3.9 percent, much lower than the average in the pre-Great Recession period (5.8 percent) and the long 1990s (7.3 percent). Table 4 ). WEO projections are lower than our predictions of trade growth using the implied trade elasticity for the longer period and are higher when we use the estimates for [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . If the latter estimates capture a further structural (and, hence, more permanent) change in the trade-income relationship rather than a transitional phenomenon, current trade projections could be overly optimistic.
Which scenario is more likely? As discussed in Section III.b, reaching a firm conclusion on the extent of the trade slowdown may be difficult at this stage. Formal tests indicate that there is a structural break in the pre-and post-Great Recession trade-income relationship, lending support to the more pessimistic scenario. However, the estimates for 2008-2013 are based on a period that may be too short to rule out cyclical factors (albeit a long cycle) and to properly capture changes in the long-term association between trade and income.
V. FACTORS EXPLAINING THE DECLINE IN TRADE ELASTICITY
The previous sections have established that the trade-income relationship has changed over time and that the lower long-term trade elasticity helps explain the global trade slowdown in recent years and is likely to affect trade growth in the near future.
In this section, we take a first look at the causes of the changing association between trade
and GDP. We first analyze the dynamics of trade and income data at a disaggregated level to identify key countries and regions where a structural break has taken place. Second, we 
A. A Regional Decomposition of the Long-run Trade Elasticity
We begin the analysis by focusing on the regional dimensions of the diminished responsiveness of trade to income in the 2000s. The technical appendix shows the details of how to decompose the long-run global trade elasticity into a weighted average of individual regions' (or, equivalently, countries') trade elasticity to their own income, where weights depend on a region's relative import and growth shares. The upshot of the decomposition is that a decline of the world trade elasticity can be explained by a combination of three factors: an increase in the import share of a region with lower trade elasticity; an increase in the relative growth of a region with lower trade elasticity; and a decrease in the elasticity of a region's imports to its own income.
We estimate equation (1) separately for advanced and emerging/low income economies, using both yearly and (when available) quarterly data. Then we repeat the exercise for selected countries. For brevity, Table 5 reports only the estimates for the long-run trade elasticity, including for the world for comparison, along with the trade and GDP growth weights. A few results stand out.
First, the responsiveness of trade to income in the 2000s is lower relative to the 1990s for both advanced economies and developing countries. Furthermore, formal tests show that there is a structural break in the trade-income relationship for both groups of countries. However, a breakdown by country uncovers interesting differences. The change in the world long-run trade elasticity is driven by a few countries that have a large share in world trade and/or are growing faster relative to the rest of the world. China and the United States turn out to be particularly important as they account for 13 and 20 percent, respectively, of the change in the world trade elasticity in the long 1990s, and for 32 and 8 percent, respectively, in the 2000s.
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In both cases, the elasticity of imports to their own GDP is significantly lower in the 2000s compared to the long 1990s. Using yearly data, the trade elasticity for the United States declined from 3.7 to 11 These numbers are the product of their share in world imports and their growth relative to world growth (see Appendix 1).
1.8, while for China the drop was from 1.5 to 1.1 (quarterly data provide slightly different figures, but confirm the substantial decline in their elasticities in the 2000s).
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Finally there is also some evidence of a structural break in the trade-income relationship for both countries between the two periods. Interestingly, the Euro Area, which accounts for a sizeable share of the world trade elasticity due to its significant import share, displayed an increasing elasticity of imports to its own income over the 2000s. Other geographical areas with decreasing trade elasticity, most notably Latin America and the Caribbean, have little weight in explaining the changing responsiveness of world trade with respect to GDP.
In the rest of this section, we therefore investigate each of the candidate explanations for the lower world trade elasticity, paying special attention to developments in China and the United States.
B. Changes in the Composition of World Trade
A first explanation is that the composition of world trade may have changed in later years towards a trade category with lower income elasticity of demand. The technical appendix shows that the trade elasticity can be decomposed into a weighted average of the elasticity of different components of trade with respect to income, where the weights are given by the share of the specific category in world trade. Hence, the decline in the world trade elasticity could be driven by a fall in the elasticity of its components and/or by an increasing share of the component with lower elasticity (i.e. by a changing composition of world trade).
To test this hypothesis, we decompose the world trade elasticity into its various components and estimate separately the elasticity of services trade and of goods trade with respect to income for the world. Results presented in Table 6 show that the main force in the decline of the world trade elasticity has been the fall of the goods trade elasticity in the 2000s, which 12 We ran country regressions both including and excluding the real effective exchange rate (REER) and results do not change much. In the tables, we report coefficients for the regressions without the REER. was driven by manufacturing trade, not by the changing composition of world trade. At the world level, the long-run manufacturing-trade elasticity was 2.6 in the long 1990s and fell to 0.8 in the 2000s. When we replicate the analysis for the United States and for China, we find that a similar pattern exists for both countries. Specifically, in the United Stated the manufacturing trade elasticity fell from 2.8 in the 1990s to 1.1 in the 2000s, while in China the manufacturing elasticity fell from 1.2 in the first period to 0.7 in the second. These results raise the question of the determinants of the manufacturing trade elasticity, an issue that we take up in the next subsection.
The services trade elasticity and the commodity trade elasticity actually increased in the more recent period relative to the long 1990s, possibly in response to the digitization of the economy and to the process of rapid and continuing industrialization in emerging economies.
Specifically, the long-run elasticity of world services trade increased from 1.8 to 2.2, while the elasticity of world commodity trade rose from 1.7 to 2.3.
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More importantly, the share of services trade in total trade has been remarkably stable at about one-fifth in the past two decades, suggesting that changes in the composition of world trade cannot explain the lower elasticity of trade with respect to GDP in recent years.
C. Changes in Vertical Specialization
A second explanation for the changing long-run trade elasticity is the varying pace of international vertical specialization. The information and communication technology shock of the 1990s led to a rapid expansion of global supply chains, with an increasing number of parts and components being imported, especially by emerging economies for processing and re-export (Baldwin, 2011) . The resulting increases in back-and-forth trade in components led to measured trade racing ahead of national income. The transition to a world where production is increasingly internationally fragmented in the long 1990s is compatible with 13 Calculating these elasticities for China and the United States gives similar results, with the one exception that the elasticity of service trade in China is lower in the 2000s than in the long 1990s. the higher long-run trade elasticity for that period (Escaith et al., 2010) . Conversely, the decline in the long-term responsiveness of trade with respect to income in the 2000s may well be a symptom that the technology shock of the 1990s has been absorbed and that the process of international production fragmentation has slowed down.
14 The changing long-term relationship between manufacturing trade and income that was documented in the previous subsection may be a symptom of changing international production relations. While the focus here is on the long-run trade elasticity, one should also expect a discrepancy between the short and the long-run dynamics of trade and income data. The persistently high short-run elasticity for the 2000s documented in Section III may reflect the fact that the impact of a GDP shock is larger in a world where global supply chains are more developed. The literature on the trade collapse discussed several mechanisms through which vertical specialization may increase the short-term responsiveness of trade to GDP -e.g. if expenditure declines more in vertically specialized sectors (Bems et al., 2011) , if there are inventory -also called bullwhip-effects (Altomonte et al., 2012) , or if there is re-nationalization of production chains (Buono and Vergara-Caffarelli, 2013) . 15 Similarly, we find evidence that the elasticity of durables trade has decreased from 2.7 in the long 1990s to 0.8 in the 2000s. This is consistent with the changing structure of global supply chains, which are more concentrated in complex goods such as durables relative to non-durable sectors (Ferrantino and Taglioni, 2014) . For brevity, these regression results are not reported. The apparent difference from our conclusions arises first of all because the WTO figures include imports not just of parts and components but also of fuel and raw materials. Since the prices of commodity inputs increased significantly in the 2000s, lumping together components and raw materials may create the impression that China's exports became more import dependent even though it was reducing its reliance on imported parts and components. Despite this difference, the data on which the WTO charts are based, and to which we were given access, show that in fact China became more upstream since 2005 and that foreign inputs contained in exports actually declined by 3 percent after 2005. share of manufacturing exports, which is not surprising given the growing importance of Chinese manufacturing exports in total merchandise exports over the period. The falling share of imports of parts and components reflects the substitution of domestic inputs for foreign inputs by Chinese firms, a finding that is corroborated by evidence of increasing domestic value added in Chinese firms (Kee and Tang, 2014) .
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The reduced responsiveness of manufacturing trade with respect to income for the United States mirrors in some ways developments in China. In the 1990s, as US firms increasingly relocated production stages outside national borders, trade tended to respond more to changes in income as variations in domestic demand were increasingly met by imports. In recent years, the international fragmentation process seems to have leveled off. In order to analyze the impact of global supply chains more systematically, we estimate the long-run elasticities of value added trade with respect to income and contrast these estimates with our results for the (gross) trade elasticities.
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The varying gap between the two provides information on the extent to which the changing pace of supply chain expansion is behind the 17 These changes do not mean that China is turning its back on globalization. As discussed in Kee and Tang (2014) , the enhanced availability of inputs domestically is in part linked to growing foreign direct investment in these industries. Moreover, there may be a geographical dimension to these changes, with China's coastal regions beginning to source relatively more from the Chinese interior, because transport and communication costs have declined more sharply with the interior than with the rest of the world. Trade integration may now be taking the form of greater internal trade than international trade, which is captured by official statistics.
Data on world domestic value added and foreign value added in gross exports from the OECD-WTO dataset are only available starting from 1995 and for selected years. Here we use a time series that was created by Duval et al. (2014) by interpolating the OECD-WTO data. Further details can be found in the technical appendix of Duval et al. (2014) . 
D. Changes in the Composition of Aggregate Demand
Another plausible explanation for the lower long-run trade elasticity concerns the changing composition of GDP. Different components of aggregate demand have different trade intensities, investment having a larger import content than private consumption and, especially, government spending. For this reason, the changing composition of GDP in the aftermath of the crisis, with its sharp decline in investment and surge in government spending, has been shown to play an important role in explaining the relationship between trade and macroeconomic dynamics during the trade collapse (Bussiere et al., 2013) .
It is possible that a prolonged reduction in the components of GDP that have the highest import content may also lead to a decline in the long-run trade elasticity. and GDP, the world trade elasticity in the pre-Great Recession period should have been increasing, as the share of investment in aggregate demand was rising, the share of public consumption was falling and private consumption remained stable. As discussed in Section III, this is not what we find in the data.
E. Changes in Protectionism
Finally, a change in protection seems to be a natural candidate for the lower responsiveness One simple way to test the role of changing protection on the dynamics of trade and income relationship is to augment equation (1) Boz et al. (2014) provide evidence consistent with this hypothesis. They use the model estimates of Bussiere et al. (2013) that are based on an "import-intensity adjusted" demand, which gives higher weight to components of demand with higher import content such as investment. They show that the model predictions are close to actual trade growth for a set of advanced economies during the global trade slowdown. longer time series though for a more limited set of policy instruments. The results from this augmented specification for the world, the United States and China are presented in Table 7 , which shows only the coefficients of interest. Once the ECM is augmented to include TTBs, the estimate of the long-run elasticity of world trade with respect to income is essentially unaltered and continues to be significant, while the variable capturing protection at the world level is not significant. The same result holds true when we use the augmented framework to 
VI. CONCLUSION
To assess whether the global trade slowdown of recent years is cyclical or structural, we analyzed the relationship between trade and income in the past four decades. We demonstrated the rise of the long-run world trade elasticity in the long 1990s and its decline in the 2000s, which set in before the Great Recession. Furthermore, we used the estimates of 20 The Global Trade Alert initiative considers a broader range of policy instruments relative to the WTO and has documented a larger number of protectionist measures since the crisis (Evenett, 2014) . This count, however, includes both trade restrictive and trade promoting measures, particularly export subsidies and various forms of fiscal incentives to exporting firms, with potentially contrasting effects on the volume of trade. an error correction model to decompose import growth and show that both long-term and short-term components contribute to explain the global trade slowdown, but that structural factors play a large role in explaining the recent low rates of world trade growth. These findings have implications for trade projections.
We then studied the underlying determinants of the decline in the trade elasticity in the 2000s. We investigated four candidate explanations: changes in the composition of trade, changes in vertical specialization, changes in the composition of GDP, and the rise in protectionism. We find evidence that a slower pace of expansion of global supply chains is an important determinant of the trade slowdown. We argued that the high trade elasticity of the long 1990s reflected the increasing production fragmentation driven primarily by the United States and China; that particular engine appears to have exhausted its propulsive energy in the 2000s. We do not find evidence that the change in composition of trade and the rise in protectionism are relevant determinants of the lower trade elasticity of the 2000s. (Krugman, 2014) . While our findings support the view that the slowdown is the result of a specific trend in international trade that may be leveling off, the flattening may nevertheless have real consequences. Specifically, the changing long-term relationship between trade and income that underpins the trade slowdown is, in part, a symptom of changing international production relations. To the extent that a finer international division of labor is isomorphic to factor-augmenting technical change (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008 ), a slower pace of its expansion could indicate that 21 As discussed in the paper, however, a slower pace of trade liberalization in the 2000s relative to the long 1990s may contribute to explain the elasticity in the latter period.
world trade is contributing less to global growth today than it did in the long 1990s. This issue merits further investigation. Looking ahead, there is still considerable scope to enhance the international division of labor by drawing in regions that have been at the margin of global supply chains, such as South Asia, Africa and South America. But how and when these untapped opportunities will be seized is an open question. world trade responsiveness to GDP is lower if the share of world imports of the trade category with lower elasticity increases over time.
Appendix 1 -Decomposition of the World Trade Elasticity
We next obtain the world trade elasticity as a weighted average of the elasticity of regions'
(or, equivalently, countries') imports to their own income. Again, for simplicity, we focus on two regions, denominated as region 1 and 2.
where is the elasticity of region i's imports to its own income. This elasticity is weighted by region i's share in world imports and by the elasticity of region i's income to world income (i.e. the growth rate of region i relative to world growth).
This decomposition indicates that a decline of the world trade elasticity can be explained by three factors. A first element can be a decline in the elasticity of a region's imports to its own income. A second factor can be the increasing import share of a region with lower trade elasticity. Finally, a third element is the increasing relative growth of a region with lower trade elasticity. 1970-2013 1970-1985 1986-2000 2001-2013 (1) (2) (3) (4) Test that long-run elasticity differs across periods 3 2 dln(total imports) t =α 1 + β 1 *dln(gdp) t *DV 1 + γ 1 *ln(total imports) t-1 *DV 1 + δ 1 *ln(gdp) t-1 *DV 1 +α 2 + β 2 *dln(gdp) t *DV 2 + γ 2 *ln(total imports) t-1 *DV 2 + δ 2 *ln(gdp) t-1 *DV 2 +α 3 + β 3 *dln(gdp) t *DV 3 + γ 3 *ln(total imports) t-1 *DV 3 + δ 3 *ln(gdp) t-1 *DV 3 +ε t , where total imports includes imports of goods and services 1991q2-2000q4 2001q1-2007q4 2008q1-2013q4 2001q1-2013q4 (1) (2) (3) dln(imports) t =α 1 + β 1 *dln(gdp) t *DV 1 + γ 1 *ln(imports) t-1 *DV 1 + δ 1 *ln(gdp) t-1 *DV 1 +α 2 + β 2 *dln(gdp) t *DV 2 + γ 2 *ln(imports) t-1 *DV 2 + δ 2 *ln(gdp) t-1 *DV 2 +α 3 + β 3 *dln(gdp) t *DV 3 + γ 3 *ln(imports) t-1 *DV 3 + δ 3 *ln(gdp) t-1 *DV 3 +ε t , where imports are represented by imports of 
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